Zero Bottles of Beer – Editorial SF Chronicle

UC BERKELEY’S Sigma Nu fraternity deserves special commendation for
trying to buck a long but ignoble Greek society tradition in which
brothers regularly and proudly drink themselves under the table.

Under a new policy insisted upon by the group’s alumni board, the
fraternity will ban alcohol — as well as tobacco and illegal drugs — on
its property.

While the prohibitions against all three substances are welcome, it is
booze that is causing the most problems on campuses. And the very real
danger of heavy drinking among college kids is too often shrugged off
despite abundant evidence of the harm it does. Four billion cans of beer
consumed on college campuses each year tell their own story.

For years, college presidents across the nation have ranked alcohol
abuse as their greatest and most stubborn problem. Binge drinking —
downing at least five alcoholic drinks in one sitting — has been tried
by more than four in 10 college students, according to a recent Harvard
College study.

Among those in the Greek system, the numbers of bingers is
astronomical. Eighty-six percent of fraternity residents and 80 percent
of sorority sisters said in the survey they had been on a recent
binge.

Such binges can and do lead to disaster. They contribute to fatal car
accidents, homicides, suicides and drownings.

Heavy boozing is also frequently linked to date rapes and pranks that
start out as harmless fun but end up as deadly crimes. According to a
report published in the Journal of American College Health, one in every
four college student deaths is associated with alcohol. The effort to
prevent such dire consequences makes the Sigma Nu brothers’ action all
the more laudable. It should be a signal to other fraternities and
sororities to follow suit and limit, if not ban, a beverage that beguiles
the innocent with false promises.

It should be respectable — and even cool — to openly resist an
unhealthy culture that encourages drinking at its nauseating, obnoxious
worst.

R. Turrisi – Current Research Preventing Drunk Driving in Adolescents

Drunk driving is a major social problem. Estimates suggest that
between 30% and 50% of all fatal crashes are alcohol related. These
estimates translate into approximately 15,000 to 25,000 deaths annually
involving the irresponsible use of alcohol. The financial costs
associated with alcohol related crashes in the United States have been
estimated in terms of billions of dollars annually in lost wages, medical
expenses, property damage, legal fees, and insurance costs. Of course,
there is no way of estimating the emotional costs to individuals who have
lost members of their families and friends in alcohol related
accidents.

It is well known that younger drivers are over-represented in driving
fatalities due to drunk driving. My research focuses on changing older
adolescent behavior with respect to drunk driving. Adolescents represent
an important target group for several reasons. First, there is evidence
indicating that the leading cause of death among young Americans is
alcohol-related traffic accidents. Second, adolescents represent new
drivers who are just embarking on a life behind the wheel of an
automobile. The establishment of safe practices and orientations
vis-a-vis drunk driving at this time is critical. Although it is the case
that high school aged adolescents are under the legal age for alcohol
consumption, estimates suggest that between 70% to 90% of all senior high
school students experiment with alcohol. Thus, the reduction of drunk
driving among this demographic group seems important.

My previous NIAAA funded research (with colleagues from the University
at Albany, SUNY) has identified empirically the kinds of information that
needs to be conveyed to teenagers in order to reduce drunk driving. Such
information potentially could be conveyed to the teen by schools, peers
(SADD), the media, parents . A review of school based treatments of drunk
driving indicates that such treatments are limited in scope. Education
about drunk driving typically occurs in mandatory health classes in which
there is tremendous competition between topics (e.g., nutrition, alcohol
consumption, drugs, sex) in terms of class coverage and class time. Drunk
driving is typically addressed only superficially and in the context of
more general lectures on alcohol. It seems unlikely that schools will
devote large amounts of class time to a specialized topic such as drunk
driving. Without special efforts on the part of schools to incorporate
the kinds of educational materials that our previous research suggests is
most effective, it is evident that other sources of information need to
be developed.

One of the lines research I have been conducting will develop
educational materials for parents of adolescents. It will teach parents
how to develop good communication patterns with their teenager. It will
teach them how to initiate communication with their adolescent about
drunk driving, even when the family history is one of minimal
parent-adolescent communication. The materials will teach parents what
information will be most effective in convincing their teenager not to
drive drunk and will teach parents the most effective ways of presenting
this information to their teen. We will then examine the impact of this
intervention on adolescent drunk driving behavior. There are several
advantages to this approach. First, it will have the general effect of
improving communication patterns between parents and teens. Second, it
will permit parents to make value judgments about the kinds of
information that their teen should be given. For example, most research
on determinants of drunk driving focuses on the act of drunk driving per
se (e.g., the increased risk of getting in a serious accident). Our
research suggests that an important set of variables that impinge on
drunk driving is how an individual construes alternative courses of
action to driving drunk as well. When faced with a situation where he or
she has consumed too much alcohol, an individual can drive drunk or
pursue some other course of action (e.g., call a taxi, stay overnight,
ask a friend for a ride home). If none of these alternatives appear
viable or desirable, the individual is more likely to drive drunk,
everything else being equal. It is possible to educate adolescents about
what alternatives to driving drunk might exist and how to most
effectively pursue these alternatives. However, our discussions with
school administrators has indicated a reluctance to incorporate such
information into school based programs. The primary objection is that by
providing effective alternatives, one might be unwittingly encouraging
adolescents to drink alcohol. This viewpoint holds that the risk to one’s
life by driving drunk is a deterrent to drinking alcohol and that by
removing this deterrent, it is more likely that the teenager will drink
alcohol, which is both illegal and undesirable. Administrators fear the
controversy that might ensue from parents of students if such an approach
is taken. With a parent based education approach, parents can be
appraised of the potential relevance of alternatives to driving drunk and
then make their own decisions about whether to address this issue and the
kinds of alternatives that are acceptable to them.

The traditional stereotype among many lay persons and social
scientists alike is that adolescence is a time when parents lose their
influence on their children and that adolescent behavior is primarily a
function of peer influences. This viewpoint is being increasingly
challenged across a wide range of research domains. In addition to my
research program on drunk driving, my colleagues at the University at
Albany, Drs. James Jaccard and Patricia Dittus, have been actively
studying parental influences on teenagers in the context of premarital
sex and unintended pregnancy. Their research efforts have clearly shown
that characterizations of minimal parental influence are based on data
that are conceptually weak and methodologically suspect and that when
approached from more compelling theoretical frameworks, parental
influence on teen behavior can be substantial.

There is a growing body of social science literature on parent
education programs in general and their effectiveness in influencing
parental behavior. Much of this research is summarized in the recent
Handbook on Parent Education. The forms of parent based interventions are
varied, including school based programs, parenting conferences, written
brochures on effective parenting, video-based programs of parenting, and
parent teacher interactions, to name a few. Programs have been aimed at
influencing such diverse child behaviors as school performance, sexual
behavior, health behaviors, and physical development, to name only a few.
It is evident from this literature that parenting education programs can
be effective, but that they are not always so. I hope to contribute to
this general body of knowledge by developing an approach to designing
parent education programs aimed at changing specific adolescent problem
behaviors. To the extent that we can show our approach produces tangible
results in an area such as drunk driving, then this will encourage
researchers to use the approach in other research domains to determine if
it can form the skeleton for programs in other domains.

Only a few published accounts of the use of parent education program
as a means of influencing drunk driving behavior in adolescence have been
published in the scientific literature. Atkin reports a parent
intervention program that led to increased concern on the part of parents
for teen drunk driving and which increased communication between parents
and teens about this topic. However, the program did not show evidence of
effects on teen drunk driving behavior. McPherson developed a program to
increase support networks for parents to discuss alcohol issues with
their teens and to convey information about drunk driving and alcohol
consumption. The results showed that parents tended to become more
assertive about talking to teens and were more likely to monitor their
teen’s behavior with regard to drunk driving. These studies suggest that
parent education programs can be effective in altering parental behavior,
but there is little evidence that these effects filter through to the
drunk driving behavior of adolescents. The focusof my research is
distinct from previous parenting interventions in several ways. First, I
have conducted extensive empirical research on our target adolescents
focusing on cognitive, attitudinal, and personality variables that are
likely to influence teen drunk driving. I have applied (and modified) a
well developed theoretical framework based on over 15 years of decision
theoretic work by Jaccard to the empirical analyses. This research has
provided a list of variables that, if changed, are likely to impact on
teen drunk driving behavior. It is these variables that will be the focus
parental education efforts. Thus, the content of the research has a
strong theoretical and empirical base that is directly tied to
determinants of drunk driving of the adolescent target population. By
contrast, past intervention efforts have not had this kind of empirical
and theoretical base. Second, the educational materials will carefully
take into account issues of adolescent development in the context of
social, emotional, cognitive, moral, and physical development. Parents
will be educated about adolescent development in each of these domains
and given specific behavioral strategies for educating their teens about
drunk driving in the context of basic adolescent development issues.

Although there are only a few studies focused on parent interventions
and adolescent drunk driving, there are numerous studies that have used
correlational paradigms to study the relationship between parental
behaviors and teen drunk driving. For example, Beck observed that parents
are more likely to attribute deviant behavior to friends of their
children rather than their children themselves and that parents generally
are not aware of the full extent of their teens’ drinking habits and
practices. Most parents admitted that they never talk to other parents
about teen drinking and driving. Beck and Lockhart reviewed factors that
can influence parent effectiveness in attempts to control adolescent
drunk driving and present a theoretical framework for analyzing parental
effectiveness. According to these authors, barriers that diminish the
impact of parents include perceptions of low levels of empowerment and
control, disaffiliation and lack of skills to communicate with their
children, low levels of awareness, a lack of social support from other
parents, and an increasing psychological distance from their children as
they grow older. Beck and Lockhart review research from other research
domains that suggest the importance of these variables. Beck, Summons,
and Matthews report the results of focus groups with parents aimed at
understanding issues related to adolescent alcohol consumption and drunk
driving. They found that parents tend to be unaware of the extent of teen
drinking, that many parents feel powerless to affect their teen’s
drinking behavior, that many parents feel a sense of isolation from other
parents dealing with similar problems, and that parents are uncommitted
to devoting large amounts of time to the problem in the context of formal
workshops. DiBlaso applied social learning theory to the analysis of
adolescent drunk driving behavior, examining the relationship between
peer variables, parental variables, and self reports of drunk driving. He
found support for a statistically significant association between
numerous parental variables (e.g., disapproval of drunk driving and
alcohol consumption, parental discipline strategies) and teen behavior.
Jessor analyzed risky driving behavior in adolescents and found that such
behavior was significantly related to parent-friend compatibility and the
number of parental models for health reinforcing behavior. Klepp and
Perry applied Problem Behavior Theory to the analysis of adolescent drunk
driving and observed little utility of parent based variables in
predicting drunk driving behavior. These studies, as well as others not
reviewed here, generally point to the potential relevance of parents in
influencing adolescent drunk driving behavior. Although there are some
negative findings and evidence to suggest that parent communications with
their teens are not frequent enough or satisfactory in quality, there
does seem to be sufficient evidence to indicate that what a parent does
and the type of relationship that a parent has with his or her teen can
and does impact on drunk driving behavior.

As noted, parent intervention programs are relatively rare in the
drunk driving domain. However, there is a much more substantial
literature on the impact of parents and parent-based interventions
focused on adolescent alcohol consumption, adolescent drug use, and
adolescent sexual behavior. There is also a substantial body of
literature on family systems approaches to the analysis of these
behaviors. Space constraints do not permit a review of these literatures
here, although overall, they affirm the promise of parent based education
efforts.

In sum, there exists sufficient empirical data both in the area of
drunk driving and related areas of adolescent problem behaviors to
suggest that parents can play an important role in influencing drunk
driving behavior. Based on data that I have collected, I believe that
parental impact will be even greater if parent-teen communication can be
encouraged and directed at the appropriate target variables identified by
our empirical and theoretical analyses. The proposed research is
significant in that it will be an important addition to the almost
non-existent literature on parent interventions aimed at reducing
adolescent drunk driving. It has the features of using a strong
theoretical base, a strong empirical base that has already been collected
and evaluated on the target populations, and it will present information
taking into consideration developmental theory on adolescence.

Last Revised: 10/10/95

Docket 95-345 — Decided June 24, 1996

———————————————————————-

In No. 95-345, the Government instituted civil forfeiture proceedings
under 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(7) against respondent Ursery’s house, alleging
that it had been used to facilitate illegal drug transactions. Shortly
before Ursery settled that claim, he was indicted, and was later
convicted, of manufacturing marijuana in violation of 841(a)(1). In No.
95- 346, the Government filed a civil in rem complaint against various
property seized from, or titled to, respondents Arlt and Wren or Arlt’s
corporation, alleging that each item was subject to forfeiture under 18
U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(A) because it was involved in money laundering violative
of 1956, and to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6) as the proceeds of a
felonious drug transaction. Litigation of the forfeiture action was
deferred while Arlt and Wren were prosecuted on drug and money-laundering
charges under 846 and 18 U.S.C. 371 and 1956. After their convictions,
the District Court granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment
in the forfeiture proceeding. The Courts of Appeals reversed Ursery’s
conviction and the forfeiture judgment against Arlt and Wren, holding
that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the Government from both
punishing a defendant for a criminal offense and forfeiting his property
for that same offense in a separate civil proceeding. The courts reasoned
in part that Halper v. United States, 490 U.S. 435, and Austin v. United
States, 509 U.S. 602, meant that, as a categorical matter, civil
forfeitures always constitute – punishmentfor double jeopardy purposes.
This Court consolidated the cases.

Held:

In rem civil forfeitures are neither “punishment” nor criminal for
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Pp. 3-23.

(a) Congress long has authorized the Government to bring parallel
criminal actions and in rem civil forfeiture proceedings based upon the
same underlying events, see, e.g., The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1, 14-15, and
this Court consistently has concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not apply to such forfeitures because they do not impose punishment,
see, e.g., Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S.
577, 581; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,
235-236 (per curiam). In its most recent case, United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, the Court held that a forfeiture
was not barred by a prior criminal proceeding after applying a two-part
test asking, first, whether Congress intended the particular forfeiture
to be a remedial civil sanction or a criminal penalty, and, second,
whether the forfeiture proceedings are so punitive in fact as to
establish that they may not legitimately be viewed as civil in nature,
despite any congressional intent to establish a civil remedial mechanism.
Pp. 5-9.

(b) Though the 89 Firearms test was more refined, perhaps, than the
Court’s Various Items analysis, the conclusion was the same in each case:
in rem civil forfeiture is a remedial civil sanction, distinct from
potentially punitive in personam civil penalties such as fines, and does
not constitute a punishment for double jeopardy purposes. See Gore v.
United States, 357 U.S. 386, 392. The Courts of Appeals misread Halper,
Austin, and Montana Dept. of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. ___, as
having abandoned this oft-affirmed rule. None of those decisions
purported to overrule Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89 Firearms
or to replace the Court’s traditional understanding. It would have been
remarkable for the Court both to have held unconstitutional a
well-established practice, and to have overruled a long line of
precedent, without having even suggested that it was doing so. Moreover,
the cases in question did not deal with the subject of this case: in rem
civil forfeitures for double jeopardy purposes. Halper involved in
personam civil penalties under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Kurth Ranch
considered a punitive state tax imposed on marijuana under that Clause.
And Austin dealt with civil forfeitures under the Eighth Amendment’s
Excessive Fines Clause. Pp. 10-19.

(c) The forfeitures at issue are civil proceedings under the two part
89 Firearms test. First, there is little doubt that Congress intended
proceedings under 881 and 981 to be civil, since those statutes’
procedural enforcement mechanisms are themselves distinctly civil in
nature. See, e.g., 89 Firearms, 465 U.S., at 363. Second, there is little
evidence, much less the “clearest proof” that the Court requires, see
e.g., id., at 365, suggesting that forfeiture proceedings under those
sections are so punitive in form and effect as to render them criminal
despite Congress’ intent to the contrary. These statutes are, in most
significant respects, indistinguishable from those reviewed, and held not
to be punitive, in Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89 Firearms.
That these are civil proceedings is also supported by other factors that
the Court has found persuasive, including the considerations that (1) in
rem civil forfeiture has not historically been regarded as punishment;
(2) there is no requirement in the statutes at issue that the Government
demonstrate scienter in order to establish that the property is subject
to forfeiture; (3) though both statutes may serve a deterrent purpose,
this purpose may serve civil as well as criminal goals; and (4) the fact
that both are tied to criminal activity is insufficient in itself to
render them punitive. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,
247- 248, n. 7, 249. Pp. 19-23.

No. 95-345, 59 F.3d 568, and No. 95-346, 33 F.3d 1210 and 56 F.3d 41,
reversed.

Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Kennedy,
J., filed a concurring opinion. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring
in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined. Stevens, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

University Police Can Arrest for DUI

Burlington, Vermont – September 1, 2006

UVM Police Have the Power

A ruling by Judge Edward Cashman last year questioned the legal
authority of the University of Vermont Police force.

But on Friday, the Vermont Supreme Court overturned that decision and
said UVM officers do have jurisdiction off campus.

Since 1991, the UVM Police Department has functioned like any other
law enforcement agency in Vermont — running radar, responding to
emergencies and making arrests on and off campus. Now the Supreme Court
says rightfully so.

“I’m pleased the rule of law came out in our favor,” said UVM Police
Chief Gary Margolis.

The department’s off campus police powers were questioned after Judge
Edward Cashman threw out drunk driving charges against a Massachusetts
man. He was stopped on a city street and not on the college campus. Judge
Cashman said UVM was not controlled by an elected body and therefore had
no authority to arrest him off campus. The Supreme Court disagreed and
reversed the lower court ruling.

“I’m glad the Supreme Court has put this issue to rest for us,” said
Chief Margolis. “It could have reversed or had an impact on every arrest
UVM police has made since its inception and that could have meant appeals
and litigation for years to come.”

While the court reviewed the case, UVM police continued normal
operations — including a major drug and weapons bust inside a Burlington
apartment. And now with the high court’s clarification, UVM officers will
continue to have police powers on and off campus.

Source: http://www.wcax.com

See ruling:
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=vt&vol=/supreme/&invol=2005-492

WHAT IS THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF “DRUNK DRIVING”?

The legal definitions of “driving” and “drunk” are open to many
interpretations, which vary subtly from state to state. In some places,
“driving” can include sitting still in a parked or wrecked vehicle with
the motor off, or starting up a car in a driveway. Police can and do
arrest people whom they believe are drunk before they get on the road and
even when they’ve pulled off to “sleep it off,” if they’re in the
driver’s seat.

As for the definition of “drunk,” there are several major factors to
consider. You can be “legally impaired” in the eyes of the law without
ever taking a drink, if you have taken other substances (including
prescribed medication) that affect your ability to drive. You can also be
found drunk even when you have all your faculties in perfect working
order.

In short, you can be found guilty of drunk driving, also called
driving while intoxicated (DWI) or driving under the influence (DUI), if
the state can prove either that:

• you are legally intoxicated while driving, meaning that your body
  shows alcohol levels above a state-mandated limit. The most common
  level is .10 percent, as determined by a blood test or breath test,
  though in some states the level is lower. (In Colorado, for instance
  you are legally impaired if your alcohol level is .05 percent.) For
  drivers of commercial vehicles, the level may be even lower.
• you have been driving while your faculties are impaired by alcohol
  or a drug–that is, that your ability to see, hear, walk, talk and
  judge distances is below normal as set by the state you’re arrested in.
  Even if your alcohol level is lower than the legal intoxication level,
  you can still be convicted if the state can show your abilities were
  impaired.

WHAT’S THE LEGAL LIMIT?

Blood tests measure the number of grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters
of blood, and breath tests measure grams of alcohol per 210 liters of
breath. In most states, you can be convicted of “drunk driving” when
either level is at .10 percent or higher. (Many states are considering a
lower level of .08 percent.) But remember, you can be convicted based on
other factors even if you don’t take the test.

State legislatures have justified these levels on the basis of
scientific testing, which has concluded that persons having a blood
alcohol content at or above .10 percent are impaired. (In some states,
such as California and Florida, the level of impairment is .08 percent.)
So, if the state can prove that at the time a person operated a motor
vehicle their blood alcohol level was above the legal limit, a conviction
for drunk driving may be possible.

The police also may sometimes be able to require that you take a blood
test to determine if you have been using drugs. Even if you have taken a
legally prescribed dose of medication, you can be convicted if you are
found to be impaired.

WHAT KINDS OF TESTS FOR IMPAIRMENT CAN THE POLICE ASK A PERSON
TO TAKE BY THE SIDE OF A ROAD?

Any type they want. They could, for instance, ask you to sing the
national anthem. However, the commonly-used types of “field sobriety”
tests include:

• the “one-leg stand” (the driver must stand on one leg for
  approximately 30 seconds)
• the “heel-to-toe” test (walking heel to toe in a straight
  line)
• the “bend test” (the driver must bend forward or backward with eyes
  closed).

Some police will ask a driver to recite the alphabet or count
backward. These, and other tests, may be conducted again at the police
station in greater detail.

In most states, including Colorado and Florida, you can refuse to take
the roadside tests without suffering any penalty. Even so, if the officer
observes the smell of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, bad balance, slurred
speech or other signs of intoxication, he usually has enough probable
cause to believe you are impaired, and therefore can arrest you on a
charge of drunk driving. However, in some circumstances your refusal to
take roadside tests could be used against you in court, though it will
not be evidence enough to convict you.

CAN A PERSON BE ARRESTED ON THE ROAD MERELY BECAUSE THE POLICE
OFFICER CLAIMED TO SMELL ALCOHOL ON HIS OR HER BREATH?

While the odor may not be enough to warrant an arrest, that fact
combined with others, such as bloodshot or watery eyes, slurred speech or
the manner of driving prior to the stop, may give the officer probable
cause to arrest the driver.

WHAT HAPPENS WHEN AN OFFICER ASKS A PERSON TO TAKE A ROADSIDE
BREATH TEST?

In a roadside test, also known as a preliminary breath test, an
officer gets an immediate measurement of your alcohol level by asking you
to breathe into a specially designed bag or a tube. The test does not
usually substitute for a formal blood or breathalyzer test, but it can be
used to determine that enough probable cause exists to arrest you. You
may refuse to take the test, but that won’t prevent the officer from
arresting you if there is enough other evidence that you are drunk.

CAN A PERSON REFUSE TO TAKE THE BREATHALYZER AT THE
STATION?

You can, but it is not a good idea. Your refusal may make it harder
for the prosecution to obtain a conviction, but because of the trend to
greater stringency you can still get convicted on the basis of the
roadside tests and other police testimony. You don’t even have the right
to a lawyer at this point in the process, because a breath or blood
sample is considered “non-testimonial” evidence.

In an attempt to ensure compliance, all states have adopted what are
known as implied consent (also called express consent) laws that apply to
testing for alcohol in the blood, breath or urine, and most states also
have such laws that apply to testing for the use of drugs. The principle
underlying these laws is that any licensed driver who operates a vehicle
has implicitly (that is, without stating it) consented to submit to
approved tests for purposes of detecting alcohol or other chemical
substances to show intoxication.

Nonetheless, even with these “implied consent” laws, you may still
refuse to take a breath, blood or urine test, BUT the state can punish
you for such a refusal with higher fines or jail terms. In many states
you also risk having your license revoked quickly, after a summary
hearing, simply because you refused. You can be convicted even if you
were sober and refused to cooperate because you objected to the police
show of power.

The drawbacks of refusal don’t stop there: If you refuse, go to trial
and are convicted, your penalty often will be harsher than if you agreed
to cooperate and take the test. You will probably lose your driving
privilege for 6 to 18 months, depending on whether it it is your first
refusal or not.

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD THE POLICE ASK FOR A BLOOD OR
URINE SAMPLE RATHER THAN A BREATH TEST?

Whenever there is serious injury or death as the result of an
accident, police will want to get a blood sample from drivers because
such tests are more scientifically solid than breath tests and will stand
up better in court. State statutes and judicial interpretations of an
individual’s right to due process generally require that blood be drawn
by medical personnel — usually at a hospital or other medical
facility.

Because drugs are more easily traced in urine than in blood, someone
arrested on suspicion of impairment through drugs may be asked to take a
urine test. Since this is not an “invasive procedure” like a blood test
and does not require special training to adminster, it may sometimes be
done at the police station rather than at a hospital.

CAN A DRIVER INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT WHERE SOMEONE IS INJURED
OR KILLED REFUSE A BLOOD TEST?

In these instances, a person’s right to refuse a test is severely
restricted. If the police have probable cause to believe that a driver is
impaired, they can and do use a reasonable amount of force to require the
driver to submit to a blood test. While this test must be performed by
medical personnel, the fact remains that the police have the right in
this situation to apply force.

In addition to drunk driving penalties, a driver involved in a fatal
accident could face criminal charges of assault, manslaughter, and even
homicide. There may also be civil penalties.

WHAT ARE THE TYPICAL PENALTIES FOR DRUNK DRIVING?

A conviction for drunk driving usually carries with it some stiff
penalties. And while these penalties will vary from state to state, they
will generally entail the loss of a driver’s license for a specified
amount of time, a fine, and possibly jail time. Other penalties may
include probation, community service, driver rehabilitation school, and
substance abuse counseling.

The high profile and get-tough policy has developed because drunk
driving has been targeted as a terrible social problem that has potential
for improvement. Organizations such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving
(MADD), led by parents who have lost children in drunk driving accidents,
have been extremely effective in stirring public outrage and lobbying for
tougher laws.

Their success has been aided by the fact that possessing a driver’s
license and operating a motor vehicle is NOT A RIGHT of every citizen,
but a privilege extended by the state in which you live. The license is
issued under a state’s regulation, and a state may revoke it. The courts
have given police wide discretion when dealing with the enforcement of
motor vehicle laws. A citizen usually has fewer rights when driving a car
than when walking on the street or residing at home.

Penalties vary sharply by state, but in all cases are highest for
accidents in which others are injured or killed, and for repeat
offenders. Sometimes a driver is arrested on a manslaughter charge
immediately after a fatal crash, if there is probable cause to believe
the driver was drunk.

As for post-conviction sentences, some states have statutes requiring
mandatory jail time–ranging from 48 consecutive hours to two years–for
a drunk driving conviction for anyone whose drinking caused a death or an
injury. Some states also require driving school and alcohol or drug
rehabilitation, and in some cases judges may sentence offenders to do
community service in emergency rooms and morgues.

The following shows a general range of penalties imposed after
conviction on drivers who were arrested in accidents or in incidents in
which there were no injuries or major damage:

For a first conviction with no injury or major damage:

1) A fine ranging from $100 to $5,000, and or, 2) Imprisonment for up
to 2 years, and or, 3) Loss of driving privilege for a certain period of
time (usually ranging from 30 days to three years)

For a second conviction on a similar charge:

1) A fine ranging from $200 to $5,000, and or, 2) Imprisonment up to
two years, and or, 3) Loss of driving privilege for up to five years. For
a third conviction on a similar charge:

1) A fine ranging from $300 to $150,000 and or, 2) Imprisonment for up
to six years, and or, 3) Loss of driving privilege for 180 days to a
permanent revocation.

CAN AN INSURER LEGALLY RAISE A PERSON’S RATES BECAUSE OF A
DRUNK DRIVING CONVICTION?

Yes. A very costly aspect of a conviction for drunk driving is the
price of insurance. Basically, insurers can charge sky-high fees and
raise the rates of convicted drivers. In some states–New Jersey, for
example–a person convicted of drunk driving must pay a mandatory $1000
per year auto insurance payment for three consecutive years, in addition
to any court-imposed penalties and fines. This is added to the increase
that will inevitably–and legally– occur in a driver’s automobile
insurance premiums.

WHAT IS THE BEST WAY TO PREVENT A CONVICTION?

There are ways to challenge a drunk driving charge, but it will be
difficult to prevail and will require expensive legal advice and possibly
the payment of an expert. Success in court is rare. As a result, most
drunk driving charges result in guilty pleas.

For those who decide to take it to the mat, it is important to
remember that if you fight and lose, a judge will sometimes impose higher
penalties. But after hearing all this, you still want to fight (you may,
after all, be not guilty). Here are some ways that others have
occasionally succeeded:

• You can challenge the breathalyzer test you took, alleging it was
  improperly administered or malfunctioned. However, be aware that this
  is becoming much more difficult to do because the test, which used to
  be mechanical, is now digital and more reliable.
• You can challenge a roadside test as improperly performed or
  inconclusive, or indeed proof positive that you were sober.
• You can argue that your alcohol level was rising, not falling, at
  the time of your breathalyzer test at the station. This is generally a
  last-ditch attempt at defense by repeat offenders; after a driver has
  had two or three convictions, is in danger of losing his license, and
  faces serious jail time, he or she may decide it’s worth it to fight
  with this tactic, which is costly but sometimes meets with
  success.

Here is the logic behind this defense: the body metabolizes alcohol at
varying rates. Levels fall and rise with time as the effects wear off. If
your level at the station was just a tad over the legal limit of .10
percent–say, .12 percent or .11 percent–you can argue that it had risen
in your blood in just the time it took to go from roadside to the
station. So you argue it was lower than the legal limit when you were
stopped, and you were not drunk driving on the road. You will in all
likelihood need an expert to testify whether the breathalyzer level
showed a rising or falling level, and the state will enlist its own
expert to refute yours. These freelance experts can be very expensive;
one well-known expert in Florida flies around the country on these cases
and charges $10,000 to a defendant for an appearance.

DO I HAVE TO? YOUR RIGHTS WHEN YOU’RE STOPPED BY THE
POLICE

A police officer is motioning you to pull over. What are your
rights?

You may REFUSE to:

• Take a roadside test in most states without suffering a penalty. In
  some states, though, a refusal can be presented as evidence against you
  in court.
• Take a breath test–but in many states refusal will result in
  automatic suspension of your license. And in every state, you can still
  be convicted of drunk driving on other grounds.
• Give permission for a search of your trunk or car interior if the
  police have no probable cause to conduct the search. You should not be
  intimidated by the police into giving consent when your really don’t
  want them to do a search– even if you’ve got nothing to hide. If the
  police ignore your refusal and search anyway, you will have a strong
  argument that anything they found cannot be used against you.

You may NOT REFUSE to:

• Stop your car.
• Give a blood or urine sample when you have been involved in an
  accident with major damage or injury. The police may apply force to
  help medical personnel take the sample.

You have no say at all when:

• The police have probable cause to search your car. In this case,
  they won’t ask permission. An unopened six-pack on the front seat
  usually won’t give them probable cause to search, but the smell of
  marijuana will.
• The police search the interior from the outside with their
  flashlights, see something illegal and seize it.

The police stop and frisk you IF they have a “reasonably articulable
suspicion” that you may be carrying weapons or drugs or other
contraband.

Drunkenness No
Barrier to Getting More Booze

THURSDAY, May 13

(HealthDayNews) — Most bars and liquor stores continue to sell
alcohol to obviously intoxicated patrons regardless of laws that prohibit
it, a new study says.

Although most states have laws that forbid bars and liquor stores from
selling alcohol to people who are obviously drunk, these laws are often
not enforced by the police and are ignored by bar and liquor store
owners. Serving alcohol to intoxicated people leads to car accidents and
violence associated with alcohol abuse.

“Despite laws prohibiting sales of alcohol to obviously intoxicated
people, the vast majority of businesses licensed to sell alcohol would
sell to someone that appeared to be intoxicated,” said lead researcher
Dr. Traci L. Toomey, an associate professor of epidemiology from the
University of Minnesota.

In their study, Toomey and her colleagues had trained actors try to
buy alcohol while appearing intoxicated. Over 10 months, actors visited
372 bars and liquor stores in 11 communities.

The research team found 79 percent of the establishments sold alcohol
to these pretend drunks.

In addition, liquor store clerks who appeared younger than age 31 were
significantly more likely than older servers at bars to sell alcohol to
clearly intoxicated buyers, according to their report in the May issue of
Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research.

Toomey believes that in many cases servers do not know what the law
is. “That should be a key part of server training programs,” she
said.

Sometimes even though servers are aware of the law, they may not know
how to handle the customer. “They don’t want to have a hostile drunk
person to deal with,” Toomey said.

In addition, other research by Toomey’s team found that, in many
cases, management policy insists on serving intoxicated patrons. Also,
communities have not paid the same attention to this problem as they have
to underage drinking, she noted.

These laws are difficult to enforce, Toomey said, adding there are few
systemic enforcement campaigns.

Penalties for violating the law vary by state and include fines and
eventual loss of a liquor license. In addition, under what is called dram
shop liability, bars and liquor stores can be sued for damages by victims
of drunk drivers or other alcohol-related crimes.

Toomey recommends aggressive training programs for servers and
management that will clarify the law and give servers and managers the
skills to help enforce the law.

“This is a risky type of alcohol service,” Toomey said. “We need to
figure out ways to pay more attention to it, and either work with
establishments or find ways to put pressure on these establishments to
make sure that they comply with the law.”

James F. Mosher, the director of the Center for the Study of Law and
Enforcement Policy at the Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation,
said the findings are “completely predictable.”

“The laws prohibiting sales to intoxicated persons are not being
enforced, and they are not being complied with by retailers,” he
added.

These are very important laws in terms of drinking and driving, Mosher
said. “We know that as many as 50 percent of drunk drivers are leaving
bars,” he noted.

These laws need to be enforced and complied with, Mosher said. There
needs to be strict enforcement and voluntary responsible beverage service
programs, he added.

If these laws are enforced, Mosher said, there would be significant
drops in drunk driving rates and in alcohol-related problems such as
violence.

Lasting Effects of a DUI / DWI, and What To Do About
Them

Most likely when you are first arrested for a drunk driving related
offense your immediate concerns are spent worrying about your freedom and
driving privileges. Those are the two most pressing concerns for someone
who has just been arrested. Depending on the circumstances involved in
your case DUI / DWI convictions can lead to prison terms and/or long term
loss of driving privileges.

DUI / DWI arrests and/or convictions can also lead to many longer
lasting problems in life if not dealt with properly. This article will
explain what these longer term DUI / DWI problems are and what you can do
about them.

Here are the other issues you’ll need to tend to
after you have settled the more immediate concerns of your DUI / DWI
offense.

DUI on Your Permanent Criminal Record.

Yes, in most cases your DUI / DWI related offense was considered a
criminal matter. As such, if you were convicted then it was recorded to
your criminal record history. This criminal history is public information
and will be attached to you for the rest of your life unless you take the
specific actions to clear it with the court that convicted you.

This makes it challenging to apply for future employment opportunities
due to the DUI / DWI resurfacing during pre-employment background checks.
These days many employers conduct background checks as a condition of
employment, and may disqualify you once they discover the previous drunk
driving arrest and/or conviction record. This is the single most lasting
effect of getting a DUI / DWI.

What You Can Do About Your DUI Criminal History.

Most people are not aware of the fact that you can eventually clear
the DUI / DWI record from your criminal history in many states across the
U.S.

If your DUI / DWI offense was a misdemeanor (and your state allows it)
you may seek what’s known as
‘expungement’ of your offense to
formally clear the DUI / DWI from your criminal record history.

Expungement, in it’s simplest form, is the clearing
and isolation of records that the court has about you (pertaining to your
DUI / DWI offense). This also includes records that any detention or
correctional facilities may have, records kept by law enforcement
agencies, etc. When you successfully clear these records utilizing
expungement procedures they will no longer exist (there are certain
exceptions allowing law enforcement and some government agencies to
continue to access them). This will allow you to legally answer,
“no†on pre-employment background checks
when asked if you have ever been convicted of any criminal offense
(provided this was your only criminal matter).

What if My DUI Offense Was Considered a Felony?

Your DUI offense may be considered a felony depending on the specifics
of the case (serious accident/injury/death, property damage valued at a
certain level, habitual offender, etc.). If you have a felony DUI / DWI
then to clear the record you first need to attempt to reduce the felony
to a misdemeanor by obtaining what’s known as a
‘pardon’. This can only be done by
petitioning the Governor of your state and asking for a reduction of your
felony to a misdemeanor.

Once a pardon is obtained then you must go through the expungement
process to clear the record as indicated above for misdemeanor DUI / DWI
offenses. If you can successfully accomplish this then
you’ll have escaped the longer lasting effects of
getting arrested and convicted of a DUI / DWI.

Tim Haider is founder of DUI Process. For
more information about this topic and other information relating to DUI
offenses including SR-22 insurance help please visit his website at: http://www.duiprocess.com

August 15, 2006 By LYNNE TUOHY, Courant Staff Writer

Responsible drunks don’t put, or leave, the key in the ignition.

The state Supreme Court has ruled unanimously that a key in the
ignition, even if the engine is not running, is grounds for charging an
intoxicated person with operating a motor vehicle under the
influence.

The court upheld the conviction of Andrew Haight, who was found asleep
behind the wheel of his legally parked Lexus by a New Canaan police
officer just after midnight Oct. 20, 2001. His car key was in the
ignition, in either the “off” or “accessory” position – a deduction based
on the chimes that sounded when Officer Kevin J. Dowling opened the car
door.

“[State law] prohibits operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence rather than merely driving a motor vehicle under the
influence,” Justice Peter T. Zarella wrote. “It is well settled that
‘operating’ encompasses a broader range of conduct than does
‘driving.’

State laws, however, don’t articulate just what that difference
is.

So the Supreme Court looked back to a 1939 ruling, in a case in which
a car was driven into a New London bank. When police arrived, they found
an intoxicated Lyman Swift sitting behind the wheel attempting to start
the car while his companion was trying to push it. Swift insisted he
hadn’t been driving the car and had moved to the driver’s seat only when
his companion got out to attempt to push the car.

The Supreme Court in that case ultimately upheld the instruction given
to the jury by the trial judge, who said Swift could be found guilty of
operating the vehicle if he “Intentionally does any act or makes use of
any mechanical or electrical agency which, alone or in sequence, will set
in motion the motive power of the vehicle.”

The justices in Monday’s ruling noted that “the present case is
analogous to Swift’s.”

“In both cases, the defendant failed to set the vehicle in motion or
even run the vehicle’s motor,” Zarella wrote. “Nothing in our definition
of ‘operation’ requires the vehicle to be in motion or its motor to be
running. … We conclude that [Haight’s] act of inserting the key into
the ignition constituted operation of a motor vehicle within the meaning
of state law.

The court said it didn’t matter whether the key was in the off or the
accessory position.

Haight’s attorney, Brenden Leydon, said he relied on a 1960 Supreme
Court decision in which the court found there was insufficient evidence
that a driver slumped over the steering wheel of his car, with the key in
the ignition, was operating under the influence. But the court said in
Monday’s ruling that the presence of the key in the ignition was
irrelevant in the 1960 decision. In that case, the two sides had agreed
that the driver was operating the vehicle; the dispute was over whether
there was sufficient evidence of intoxication.

Leydon said the ruling in Haight’s case reflects “the general policy
of getting tough on drunk driving, which is understandable.”

“Our position all along was it was better for people to sleep it off,
rather than get out of town quickly,” Leydon said. “That was our policy
reliance.”

Leydon said Haight had entered his car after having dinner and drinks
at a local restaurant. “There was no evidence he ever moved the car at
all.”

Source: http://www.courant.com