See the Third District Court of Appeals of California's Ruling

The decision by the three judge panel involves a case filed against two California Highway Patrol officers. The CHP officers arrested Scott St. Pierre for California DUI and driving with a suspended license, after a minor traffic accident. Later in the day, police released St. Pierre and allowed his mother to retrieve his impounded car. Hours later St. Pierre was involved in an accident that killed Jerry Walker. Relatives of Walker sued the California Highway Patrol, saying that the CHP officer’s failure to keep St. Pierre’s seized vehicle resulted in a wrongful death. A trial court agreed that when a vehicle is seized during a suspended license case, the law says it must be impounded for thirty days.

The Appeals Court found the trial court had technically misread the law. The Appeals judges went on to say that their interpretation follows the legislative intent of the law. They pointed out that the state of California would need the space to store one million vehicles if every motorist driving without a license was apprehended and their vehicles impounded for thirty days.

The Court also ordered the dismissal of the suit filed against the CHP officers.

Arrested for a DUI in California? You will need to hire a California DUI lawyer to help you fight your drunk driving charge and to save your driver's license.

A county sheriff’s deputy patrolling in an unmarked police car became suspicious of a vehicle driven slowly by Paul Dyer. After following Dyer and claiming his Jeep Cherokee crossed highway lines several times, a traffic stop was initiated. The officer suspected driving under the influence in California and had a second deputy arrive on the scene with a marked squad car. Though a breath test revealed a blood alcohol content below the legal limit for intoxication, the officer deemed the test ‘inconclusive’ and had Dyer arrested anyway.

A trial court dismissed the California DUI and ordered the return of the defendant’s driver’s license. The Department of Motor Vehicles appealed that decision.

California has outlawed unmarked police cars since 1923, in a direct effort to eliminate speed traps designed to supplement local revenues through exorbitant fines. The statute requires distinctively marked law enforcement vehicles.

The three-judge Appeals Court ruled that the officer with the unmarked vehicle in the Dyer case only played a supervisory role, and the actual arrest was made by the second officer. In addition, the court declined to apply the speed trap law to other traffic offenses, like drunk driving in California. The court ordered a new trial to determine if Dyer was legally intoxicated at the time of his DUI arrest.

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The bill states that the return of a motorist’s driver’s license would be contingent upon the documented installation of an ignition interlock device.

If you have been arrested for Driving Under the Influence in California you will need to hire a qualified California DUI attorney.

Driving in Arresting Officers Presence

This always involves a question of whether or not the defendant's activities witnessed by the arresting officer amounted to the act of "driving".

Circumstantial Presence Evidence

People v Bellomo (1984) . . . there was no need to decide whether or not the defendant was driving in the presence of the arresting officer when the defendant was found asleep behind the wheel, with the engine running, in a traffic lane, awaiting a red light . . . guilty (40300.5).

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Under California law, anyone who drives a car implicitly agrees to submit to a test for alcohol or face a license suspension. In upholding Troppman's suspension by the Department of Motor Vehicles, a state Court of Appeal panel in San Francisco ruled in February that the requirement covers any case in which police reasonably suspect the person had been driving while drunk.

To go further and require proof that the person had actually been driving "would undermine the policy goals of encouraging cooperation in testing and deterring of drunk driving,'' said Justice William McGuiness.

But Troppman's lawyer, John Halley, said in a Supreme Court appeal that implicit in the law is a requirement that authorities show proof of actual driving, because "it is the act of driving from which consent (to be tested) is implied.'' The case is Troppman vs. Gourley, S13249.

DRUNK DRIVING - LICENSE SUSPENSION - NO EVIDENCE OF DRIVING REQUIRED

Troppman v. Gourley (2005) Cal.App.4th , 05 C.D.O.S. 1190 First Dist., 2/8/05, A105287

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT - DIVISION THREE (PDF Download)

License of suspected drunk driver may be suspended or revoked for refusal to submit to chemical test even in absence of finding that person was actually driving a car at the time of the offense. Follows its prior decision in Rice v. Pierce (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1460, and declines to follow Jackson v. Pierce (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 964 (from the Fifth).

Use Note: the driver in this case was slumped over the wheel of a stopped car, and was the only occupant. I think the result would be different if a drunken licensee was being driven home by a designated driver. Here the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe licensee had been driving.

By Bob Egelko, Chronicle Staff Writer

Friday, May 20, 2005

Are you in need of a California DUI Attorney?

(1) Submits proof satisfactory to the department of enrollment in, or completion of, a driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section 11836 of the Health and Safety Code, as described in subdivision (b) of Section 23538.

(2) Submits proof of financial responsibility, as defined in Section 16430.

(3) Pays all applicable reinstatement or reissue fees and any restriction fee required by the department.

(b) The restriction of the driving privilege shall become effective when the department receives all of the documents and fees required under subdivision (a) and shall remain in effect until the final day of the original suspension imposed under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 13352, or until the date all reinstatement requirements described in Section 13352 have been met, whichever date is later, and may include credit for any suspension period served under subdivision (c) of Section 13353.3.

(c) The restriction of the driving privilege shall be limited to the hours necessary for driving to and from the person's place of employment, driving during the course of employment, and driving to and from activities required in the driving-under-the-influence program.

(d) Whenever the driving privilege is restricted under this section, proof of financial responsibility, as defined in Section 16430, shall be maintained for three years. If the person does not maintain that proof of financial responsibility at any time during the restriction, the driving privilege shall be suspended until the proof required under Section 16484 is received by the department.

(e) For the purposes of this section, enrollment, participation, and completion of an approved program shall be subsequent to the date of the current violation. Credit may not be given to a program activity completed prior to the date of the current violation.

(f) The department shall terminate the restriction issued under this section and shall suspend the privilege to operate a motor vehicle pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 13352 immediately upon receipt of notification from the driving-under-the-influence program that the person has failed to comply with the program requirements. The privilege shall remain suspended until the final day of the original suspension imposed under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 13352, or until the date all reinstatement requirements described in Section 13352 have been met, whichever date is later.

(g) The holder of a commercial driver's license who was operating a commercial motor vehicle, as defined in Section 15210, at the time of a violation that resulted in a suspension or revocation of the person's noncommercial driving privilege under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 13352 is not eligible for the restricted driver's license authorized under this section.

(h) If, upon conviction, the court has made the determination, as authorized under subdivision (d) of Section 23536 or paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 23538, to disallow the issuance of a restricted driver's license, the department may not issue a restricted driver's license under this section.

(i) This section shall become operative on September 20, 2005. Added Sec. 5, Ch. 551, Stats. 2004. Effective January 1, 2005. Operative September 20, 2005

Source: http://www.dmv.ca.gov/pubs/vctop/d06/vc13352_4.htm

If it is your first DUI you will need a California DUI Attorney.

If you talk to an attorney there are all sorts of variables they will consider. They usually will not give you a clear answer. After ten years of working with first offenders I can tell you within a general framework of what MOST DUI (VC23152) first offenders receive in the 10 county Bay Area.

First Offender Penalties

In Court

• $1200 fine.
• 3 years probation (informal - no probation officer).
• 3-5 days sheriff work alternative program (picking up trash, cleaning buses, etc.) OR
• 90 license restriction (to start AFTER 4 months DMV suspension is over).
• First Offender School (3/4 months long).

This is in addition to the four months immediate DMV suspension that starts 30 days after your DUI stop.

These two ACTIONS (court and DMV) are SEPARATE and do not influence one another. Many times someone gets their license back by going to the DMV hearing and then is convicted in the court. Or, the DA drops the charges and the DMV still suspends your license!

With the conviction in the court you are allowed to get a restricted license AFTER a 30 day hard suspension (after the 30 day temporary license period is over = two months after your DUI stop). This allows you to drive to and from work and in the course of your employment and to and from the DUI class. The only 'draw back' to the license restriction is that it is restricted for 5 months (they say 6 but the DMV counts the first month of suspension). OR you can ride out the 4 months suspension period and get you license back. BUT, once the court notifies the DMV that you have been convicted of a DUI or a wetreckless and as part of your probation you have been sent to a First Offender Program. The requirement to show proof of completion of the program will be added to the list of items needed (Proof of Insurance SR-22 and pay $125 to get your license returned.

Remember after January 1, 2003 ALL persons convicted of a DUI in California (23152) will be required to attend and complete a level one program (whether the court sent you to one or not!)

This is GENERALLY the way it works for those convicted of a misdemeanor first offense DUI.

If it is your first offense you will need a California DUI Lawyer.

The difference between a misdemeanor and a felony is: misdemeanor driving under the influence charges means that the charge involved no injury or property damage and the penalty is up to 6 months in jail whereas a felony has injury and the penalty could be as much as up to one year in a state prison.

VC 23152: Alcohol and or Drugs: (a). It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of an intoxicating beverage,or under the combined influence of an alcoholic beverage or drug to drive a vehicle.

The problem immediately is what does "under the influence" mean?

The most common understanding of the term is when the person starts to stumble and fall, lose coordination, have slower reaction times, lose the ability to process information, experience visual impairments or go through personality changes.

Standard Dictionary Definition

Webster defines intoxicated as being 'elated', hardly a legal definition.

A legal definition, from 1970 states under the influence as:

person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor when as a result of drinking such liquor his physical and mental abilities are impaired so that he no longer has the ability to drive a vehicle with the caution characteristic of a sober person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.

The second part of the vehicle code DUI law continues to state in addition to the above "under the influence" paragraph, a driver is also under the influence when:

VC 23152: Alcohol and or Drugs: (b) It is unlawful for any person who has a .08 percent or more by weight to drive a vehicle.

This more exacting definition of what under the influence is was put in the vehicle code in 1982 and is considered "per se". When you are arrested for DUI in California and you must submit to a chemical test, the results of that test can be used as evidence in court. This is called presumptive or prima facie evidence. Technically, prima facie means "at first view." Legally, it means "adequate to establish the fact unless refuted" (proved wrong).

Illegal "per se" law means that no evidence other than the results of a properly obtained chemical test is required to convict the defendant. In other words, if you’re chemical test results are a .08 (and all else was legal i.e. stop, arrests etc.) you are considered under the influence according to California DUI law.

Legal presumptions about levels of alcohol in the blood are stated in presumptions about under the influence are stated in another law VC 23155.

Are you in need of a California DUI Lawyers?

If you have been arrested for driving under the influence, you will need to find California DUI Lawyers.

If you have been arrested for drunk driving you will need a California DUI Lawyer.

Cell Phones Operative July 1, 2008 Requires the use of hands-free wireless phones as of July 1, 2008, with limited exceptions.

Commercial Driver License Ensures immediate administrative driver licensing sanctions are imposed when any driver is operating a commercial vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .04% or greater.

Requires California to report convictions of commercial driver traffic violations to the home state of the commercial driver for sanctioning purposes. Establishes the following: A first conviction for driving any vehicle under the influence of drugs is cause for the disqualification of the commercial driving privilege for one year. A commercial driver who is convicted of leaving the scene of an accident, regardless of whether the violation occurred in a commercial vehicle or the driver's personal vehicle, is subject to the disqualification of the commercial driving privilege for one year. A first conviction of gross vehicular manslaughter or vehicular manslaughter is cause for the disqualification of the commercial driving privilege for one year. Eliminates the authority for the issuance of a restricted commercial driver's license when the driving privilege is suspended or because the driver or driver's family has a serious health problem (does not prohibit the issuance of a restricted Class C or M license; thereby allowing the commercial driver to operate a non-commercial vehicle).

Driver License Removes the minimum age requirement for persons to consent to participate in the organ and tissue donor program.

Driver License Suspension Increases the mandatory driver's license suspension period to ten months for persons convicted of a first offense of Driving Under the Influence of alcohol if the individual's blood alcohol concentration level was .20% or greater, and the court orders an enhanced alcohol treatment program.

Driving Infraction Creates a new infraction for driving a motor vehicle while knowingly permitting a person to ride in the trunk. A passenger found guilty of riding in the trunk of a vehicle would be guilty of an infraction. Both the driver and passenger would be subject to fines pursuant to a specified schedule. A driver convicted of knowingly permitting passengers to ride in/on the trunk of a vehicle would receive one negligent operator point on his or her driving record.

Makes driving under age 21 with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.01% or greater a citable offense, and if convicted, the person would be guilty of an infraction subject to increased court fines. Currently subject to suspension under the Zero Tolerance Law. However, this would not be a point count, according to Vehicle Code §12810.

Emergency Vehicles Requires drivers to take specific precautionary actions on a highway when passing a stopped emergency vehicle when the emergency lights are activated. Makes it an infraction for failure to comply with those requirements.

Equipment of Vehicles Clarifies existing statute regarding the use of headlamps during darkness and/or inclement weather.

Graffiti and Vandalism Allows courts to impose increased driver license sanctions for graffiti and vandalism. Courts may now suspend a driver license for a period of up to two years, or delay issuing a license for a period of one to three years.

Ignition Interlock Device Prohibits a manufacturer of an ignition interlock device (IID) from furnishing information to any individual or entity that would allow modifications to be made that would allow it to be used in a manner that is contrary to its intended purpose. Prohibits the tampering of an IID by a service center or technician and prohibits reinstatement of the driving privilege until the DMV receives proof that the device has actually been installed. Requires DMV to verify installations on court ordered IID.

Mature Driver Improvement Course Revises the Mature Driver Improvement Program by increasing the maximum allowable course fee and by providing for a renewal course with reduced instructional time. Addresses comments of course participants who do not believe the full 400-minute course is necessary every three years for renewal purposes. Allows course providers to charge a fee of up to $30 for either the initial or renewal course and providers indicate this fee increase is needed because costs have risen since the inception of the program in 1986. Requires DMV to establish standards and develop criteria and review each provider's renewal course lesson plan to ensure it meets the Mature Driver Improvement Course requirements.

Pull Notice Adds ambulance certificate holders to the current list of certificate holders who are required to participate in the department's Pull Notice Program.

Reckless Driving/Racing Increases penalties for first conviction of reckless driving or engaging in a speed contest resulting in specified injuries to a person other than the driver. First-offenders would be subject to confinement in state prison or county jail for not less than 30 days nor more than 6 months, or by a fine of not less than $220 (reckless driving) or $500 (speed contest) nor more than $1000. The specified injuries which would incur these sentences are; loss of consciousness, concussion, bone fracture, protracted loss or impairment of function of a bodily member or organ, wound requiring extensive suturing, serious disfigurement, brain injury, and/or paralysis.

School Bus Certificate Authorizes the California Highway Patrol to conduct a preliminary criminal and driver history check to determine the eligibility of an individual prior to issuing a special certificate authorizing the operation of a schoolbus, school pupil activity bus, youth bus, or a general public paratransit vehicle. Exempts school bus mechanics and driver trainees from having to obtain a school bus endorsement for the operation of the vehicle provided they are not engaged in the transportation of children.

Three-Tier Driver Assessment Project Requires the department to conduct a study of a Three-Tier Driver Assessment System, contingent upon receipt of grant money, and determine the effectiveness of the program in identifying functional impairments, reducing crashes, and prolonging safe driving years of all drivers regardless of age.

Are you in need of a California DUI Lawyer?

Source: http://www.dmv.ca.gov/about/leg/leginfo_dl.htm

Motorists who have been convicted of certain driving violations, including California DUI and reckless driving, can have their record ‘expunged’. A request to clear one’s arrest record can be made after successful completion of the terms of probation mandated by a court. Moving violations, like speeding, are removed from the Department of Motor Vehicles records over time. Criminal convictions, however, remain on a permanent record unless they are expunged.

Last June, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed California Assembly Bill 645, which, when it goes into effect in January, will alter the current expungement law and make it more difficult to clear one’s record. The new law will require those seeking to expunge their records to prove to a judge that the request is “in the interest of justice.”

The consequences of having a criminal record are significant. Computers, and the subsequent growth in databases with personal information, mean that arrest records are easily discovered and shared. Canada has long denied those with a criminal record to enter the country, and file sharing with the United States since September 11, 2001 has led to a marked increase in the enforcement of that statute. A criminal record can make it difficult to find or keep a job, as reports show that more than 80% of employers routinely perform background checks on job applicants.

California criminal defense lawyers are urging their clients to apply for expungement before the January 1, 2008 deadline. If not, they warn that those who have been convicted of DUI in California, reckless driving or driving with a suspended driver’s license may have to go through life with a permanent criminal record.

Are you in need of a California DUI Attorney?

Under California law, if you have been suspected of driving while intoxicated, and refuse to take a breath test, your license will be automatically suspended. The Supreme Court ruling says the penalty for refusing a test to measure blood alcohol content applies broadly to all those who drive and use the public streets and highways and no proof is required of actual driving immediately prior to a suspected DUI arrest.

The issue stems from a 2003 case where Terry Troppman was found passed out behind the wheel of her car while parked on the side of the road. Police suspected intoxication and administered a series of field sobriety tests, which Troppman failed. A partially consumed bottle of wine was found in her vehicle though Troppman denied drinking and driving. She said she had consumed the wine only while sitting in her parked car. Even though no one had witnessed Troppman driving after drinking, when she refused to submit to a breath test, her license was suspended.

The ruling by the high court affirms the act of refusal is sufficient to result in the revocation of one’s license.

S085213

The People, Ct. App. 1/4

Plaintiff and Respondent, A085945 v. Solano County Super. Ct. No. J29844

ArtUro D., Defendant and Appellant. )

The People, S085218

Plaintiff and Respondent

Ct. App. 4/3 v. G023616

Randall ray hinger, )Orange County Super Ct. No. 97CF2564

Defendant and Appellant.

We granted review in these matters to determine whether, when a driver who has been detained for citation for a Vehicle Code infraction fails to produce vehicle registration or personal identification documentation upon the request of the citing officer, the officer may conduct a warrantless search for such documentation, and, if so, the permissible scope of such a search. After briefing was complete, we consolidated these two matters for purposes of oral argument and opinion. We conclude that in these circumstances the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, permits limited warrantless searches of areas within a vehicle where such documentation reasonably may be expected to be found. Applying that standard, we conclude that the document searches in both cases were proper, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment in In re Arturo D. (S085213), and affirm the judgment in People v. Hinger (S085218).

I.
A. In re Arturo D.

At approximately 11:30 p.m. on a weeknight in late August 1998, Suisun City Police Officer Rowe stopped minor Arturo D.'s extended cab truck, which had been traveling more than 70 miles per hour in a 50 mile-per-hour zone. Arturo was driving and was accompanied by two passengers, one of whom was stretched across the truck's rear pull-down seat. When asked for his identification, Arturo gave his name, date of birth, and a Vallejo address, but admitted that he lacked a valid driver's license and that the truck was not his. Arturo provided no documentary evidence as to his identity, proof of insurance, or vehicle registration. At that point, Officer Rowe planned to issue defendant a citation for speeding and for driving without a license. Rowe asked the occupants to exit from the truck, and they did so. From inside the front of the truck cab, Rowe then blindly felt with his hands under the driver's seat for documentation relating to the driver and the vehicle. Not encountering such documents, Rowe repositioned himself behind the driver's seat, bent down, and looked under the seat. Rowe found a glass smoking pipe located "towards the center" of the floor under the driver's seat. In the same location Rowe also found a blue box containing a white vial, which itself contained an unusable amount of white powder. Rowe asked whether the items belonged to Arturo, and he replied that they did.

Rowe issued a citation to Arturo for speeding and driving without a license, and because there was no licensed driver to drive away the truck, Rowe made arrangements to have the vehicle towed. (Veh. Code, §§ 12500, subd. (a), 14602.6, subd. (a), 22651, subd. (p).) Arturo went to the police station, planning to make a telephone call to arrange a ride home. At the police station Rowe examined the blue box more closely, discovering in an internal compartment a plastic bindle containing a usable quantity of a white powdery substance that, after testing, proved to be methamphetamine. Arturo then was placed under arrest. The district attorney subsequently filed a petition alleging that Arturo came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, in that he possessed methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) (count I) and an opium pipe (id., § 11364) (count II), and had driven without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)) (count III).

At the jurisdictional hearing, the trial court denied Arturo's suppression motion and sustained the petition as to counts II and III. Thereafter the court adjudged Arturo a ward of the court, and he appealed. In a published opinion, Division Four of the First District Court of Appeal reversed the order denying Arturo's motion to suppress the smoking pipe, reasoning that "the scope of the officer's intrusion went beyond that justified by the need to locate registration [and other identifying documents] and accordingly, it was unreasonable as a search for registration [and other identifying] documents."

B. People v. Hinger

In August 1997, while driving alone in his automobile, defendant Randall Hinger was stopped by Orange Police Officer Skinner for making unsafe lane changes. Hinger told Skinner that his name was "Randy Hinger" but that he did not have his driver's license with him, and that he had no documentation concerning the car he was driving. At some point during this process, Skinner noticed Hinger open the glove compartment of the vehicle. According to the officer, Hinger explained that he only recently had purchased the vehicle, or that he was in the process of purchasing it.

With Officer Skinner's permission, Hinger exited from the car. While Skinner used his radio to conduct a record check on Hinger's name and automobile, a backup officer arrived. While waiting for the requested record check, Skinner asked Hinger whether he could search the car. Hinger declined to consent. After Skinner informed Hinger that he would look for identification and registration notwithstanding Hinger's refusal, Hinger said he might have a wallet in the car after all, suggesting it could be in the glove compartment.

Officer Skinner noticed that the glove compartment that Hinger previously had opened was still ajar, exposing some loose papers. As Skinner later explained, "I wanted to find out who [defendant] was. I wanted to make sure that the name he gave me was his real name and make sure that the vehicle that he was driving either was in the process of belonging to him or was not stolen, or just to document who the vehicle belonged to." Skinner opened the front passenger door and lifted up the loose papers in the glove compartment, but found no identifying documents or wallet. Skinner then walked to the driver's side of the car, opened the door, and looked under the front seat for the wallet, finding nothing there. The officer walked back to the passenger side of the car and looked under the passenger seat (apparently doing so from the vantage point of the front of the seat). There Skinner saw and seized a wallet. Upon opening the wallet, he found inside a form of identification &endash; a check-cashing card with Hinger's photograph on it &endash; and a clear plastic baggie containing methamphetamine.

Hinger was arrested for possession of methamphetamine and pleaded guilty to that charge after the superior court denied his motion to suppress the foregoing evidence. In an unpublished opinion, Division Three of the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, finding that the officer's search for identifying documentation was reasonable under the circumstances and that the contraband found during the course of that search was admissible.

II.

Vehicle Code sections 4462 and 12951 long have required that the person in the immediate control of an automobile present evidence of registration and a driver's license upon proper command of a peace officer. Section 4462, subdivision (a), provides: "The driver of a motor vehicle shall present the registration or identification card or other evidence of registration of any or all vehicles under his or her immediate control for examination upon demand of any peace officer." Section 12951, subdivision (b), provides: "The driver of a motor vehicle shall present his or her license for examination upon demand of a peace officer enforcing the provisions of this code." The reason for these provisions is plain: An officer who has stopped a vehicle for a traffic infraction and who plans to issue a citation needs to ascertain the true identity of the driver and the owner of the vehicle, in order to include that information on the citation and the written promise to appear. (People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 584, fn. 5 [registration and license "documents are . . . the source of most of the information needed by the officer to complete the citation"].) But what action by the officer is permissible when, upon proper demand, a motorist who has been stopped for a traffic violation fails to produce the registration or license documentation required by statute?

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." Although it is well established that motorists have a cognizable privacy interest against unreasonable searches and seizures, the United States Supreme Court frequently has observed that, in light of the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways, individuals generally have a reduced expectation of privacy while driving a vehicle on public thoroughfares. (E.g., New York v. Class (1986) 475 U.S. 106, 112-113 (Class) [upholding limited warrantless search of automobile to discover its vehicle identification number].) The threshold question posed in the two cases before us is this: In the context of a valid traffic stop during which a driver fails to produce the required automobile registration, drivers' license, or identification documentation upon an officer's proper demand, do the government's regulatory needs and the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the driver operate to allow an officer, consistently with the Fourth Amendment, to conduct a limited warrantless search for such documentation?

A.

The leading case on this subject is People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 429 (Webster). There, California Highway Patrol (CHP) Officer Abbott stopped the defendant for speeding on a freeway. In response to the officer's request for a driver's license, the defendant produced only a birth certificate. (See ante, fn. 4.) As the officer wrote out the ticket, he asked who owned the vehicle. The defendant responded, incongruously, that his five passengers were hitchhikers and that one of them owned the car. The officer thereafter learned via radio that the defendant was wanted on an outstanding warrant and placed him in the officer's patrol car. Upon the subsequent arrival of backup officers, the officer returned to the stopped vehicle to ask the passengers which one of them owned the car. After all five denied ownership, Officer Abbott ordered the passengers out of the car, searched unsuccessfully for registration papers in the vehicle's glove compartment and on the sun visor, but did not find any registration document. In the course of that search he did notice, however, a wallet on the front seat, where one of the passengers had been sitting. Abbott asked each of the passengers and the defendant whether he owned the wallet. When all denied ownership, Abbott opened the wallet to determine its ownership, then observed that it belonged to another person. Later it was discovered that the defendant and four of his passengers earlier that day had robbed the individual who owned the wallet and on the preceding day had murdered another individual.

The defendant challenged the search on the grounds that "Abbott had neither a warrant, nor probable cause, nor justification based on exigent circumstances." (Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d 411, 430.) This court upheld the search against the defendant's Fourth Amendment claim. We observed, in relevant part: "At the outset, we conclude Abbott acted properly when he . . . entered the car for the limited purpose of finding the registration. Then, as now, the Vehicle Code allowed a CHP officer, among others, to inspect a [registerable] vehicle and its title in order to determine ownership. (Veh. Code, § 2805, subd. (a).)[] The law also required the driver of a motor vehicle to produce his or her license and registration for examination upon a peace officer's demand. ([Veh. Code], §§ 4462, subd. (a), 12951, subd. (b).) Within constitutional limits, such statutes authorize an officer to enter a stopped vehicle and conduct an immediate warrantless search for the required documents. (E.g., People v. Faddler (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 607, 610-611; People v. Burnett (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 795, 799-800; Jackson v. Superior Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 361, 367; People v. Martin (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 444, 447. . . .)" (Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 411, 430, fns. omitted, italics added.)

We also noted in Webster that the vehicle "was validly detained on the highway for a moving traffic violation" and that given the "uncertain situation" concerning ownership of the car, the officer "was amply entitled to inspect the [vehicle's] registration to ascertain its owner before deciding whether to release or impound the vehicle." (Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d 411, 430-431.) Commenting that it was reasonable for Abbott to order the passengers out of the vehicle and to search for the documentation himself, we observed that "[a]t the time he saw the wallet, Abbott was confining his search to the visor and glove compartment, traditional repositories of auto registrations." (Webster, at p. 431, italics added.) We concluded: "While engaged in these appropriate activities, Abbott saw the wallet lying in plain view in the now-empty interior. The observation and seizure of evidence in plain view from a position where the officer has a right to be is not constitutionally prohibited. (People v. Rios (1976) 16 Cal.3d 351, 357 . . . .)" (Ibid.)

Prior to and subsequent to Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d 411, California courts have held in analogous circumstances that it is constitutionally proper for an officer to conduct a limited warrantless search of a vehicle for the purpose of locating registration and other related identifying documentation. (See cases cited in Webster supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 430 [quoted ante, at p. 9]; see also People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 182 (Turner); People v. Hart, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th 479, 489; People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 927.)

B.

The parties focus upon two decisions of the United States Supreme Court &endash; one issued several years prior to the 1991 decision in Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d 411 but not cited therein (Class, supra, 475 U.S. 106), and the other issued several years after Webster (Knowles v. Iowa (1998) 525 U.S. 113 (Knowles)). The Attorney General asserts that the first case, Class, supports Webster and the propriety of the searches here at issue. Defendants contend otherwise, and argue that in any event the second case, Knowles, undermines Webster and invalidates both searches.

1.

In Class, supra, 475 U.S. 106, two officers stopped the defendant driver for traffic infractions. The driver emerged from his car, closed the vehicle's door, and produced registration and insurance documents, but no license. One of the officers then opened the defendant's car door in order to look for the vehicle identification number (VIN), which was located on the doorjamb of cars made before 1969. Not seeing a VIN at that location, the officer decided to look for one in the other spot where a VIN regularly is found in more recently manufactured vehicles, on the top of the dashboard &endash; an area normally visible from outside a vehicle. The officer reached inside the car to remove some papers covering that area of the dashboard, and in doing so he noticed the handle of a gun beneath the driver's seat. The gun was seized, and the defendant was arrested for possession of the weapon. (Class, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 108.)

The high court upheld the warrantless search on a five-to-four vote. All members of the court agreed that the Fourth Amendment was implicated and that a search had occurred. All also agreed that the search was unsupported by probable cause to believe that the car was stolen or that it contained contraband, and that the search could not be justified under the so-called automobile exception or any other exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. It was also apparently conceded or assumed that no other recognized exception to the warrant requirement applied to allow the search.

In nonetheless upholding the search under a balancing test that considered " 'the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion' " (Class, supra, 475 U.S. 106, 118), the majority emphasized, among other things, (i) the importance of the VIN system in tracking stolen vehicles and in promoting highway safety (id., at pp. 111-112), (ii) the generally decreased expectation of privacy that drivers have with regard to automobiles, the VIN in particular, and the pervasive regulatory scheme that surrounds the use of vehicles on public roads (id., at pp. 113-114), (iii) officer safety concerns (id., at p. 116), and (iv) the limited nature of the search undertaken. In the latter respect, the majority observed that the officer did not "root about the interior" of the car or "reach into any compartments," but that the search was instead "focused in its objective, and no more intrusive than necessary to fulfill that objective." (Id., at pp. 118-119.)

Justice Brennan's dissent in Class, supra, 475 U.S. 106, 125, argued that "[b]ecause the Fourth Amendment constrains the State's authority to search automobiles under the guise of 'regulation,' the fact that the Government uses the VIN as part of its scheme for regulating automobiles is insufficient to justify a search of the passenger compartment to retrieve such information." (Dis. opn. of Brennan, J., joined by two other justices, italics omitted.) Expanding on this theme, the dissenters argued that the search was not justified in any event, because the officer had no reason to search for the VIN &endash; the driver having previously produced registration documentation. (Id. at pp. 127-131 (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.).)

Plainly, the high court's majority opinion in Class, supra, 475 U.S. 106, did not address the propriety of the limited type of search here at issue. But the majority's reasoning and approach in approving the limited warrantless search in Class are not inconsistent with a similar analysis and conclusion in the context of Webster-type searches. (See 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure (3d ed. 1996) § 9.5(e), p. 296 ["Class may mean that in some circumstances the police may, without a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and presently dangerous, enter a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation to seek out other required documentation"].) Indeed, in at least one important respect, Webster-type searches may be more justifiable under the Fourth Amendment, in that the basis for a search for identification and registration documentation preparatory to the issuance of a citation would appear to be more compelling than the justification for a search to discover the VIN of a vehicle for which the driver already had produced apparently valid registration documentation. It may be questioned whether a majority of the high court, or even the dissenters in Class, would have prohibited a limited warrantless search when, as in the cases before us, the driver, in response to a proper demand, professes to lack the required documentation needed for an officer to issue a proper citation. In sum, we conclude that the high court's decision in Class does not impair the general validity of Webster-type searches.

2.

As noted, defendants also question the continuing validity of limited warrantless searches for license and registration documents under Webster and related cases in light of the 1998 decision in Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. 113, in which the high court unanimously held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits a full-scale warrantless search of an automobile incident to the issuance of a traffic citation. As explained below, absent a clear indication to the contrary from the United States Supreme Court, we conclude that Knowles does not undermine Webster and related case law.

In Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. 113, 114, an officer stopped the defendant for speeding and issued a citation. Thereafter, pursuant to state statute, the officer proceeded to conduct a full-scale warrantless search of the vehicle for contraband. In so searching, the officer discovered a bag of marijuana and a pipe under the driver's seat. (Ibid.) The state supreme court, analogizing to the full-scale warrantless search for contraband that would be permissible pursuant to a search incident to a custodial arrest (United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218 [search of person, incident to custodial arrest]; New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454 [search of automobile interior, incident to custodial arrest of car occupant]), upheld the search under what was characterized as a "search incident to citation" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. (Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. at p. 115.)

The high court held that the twin rationales supporting the search incident to custodial arrest exception to the warrant requirement &endash; officer safety and the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial &endash; were not present on the facts in Knowles, in which the driver already had been issued a citation following a routine traffic stop. (Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. 113, 116-117.) In rejecting the argument that a full "search incident to arrest" was justified in order to discover and preserve evidence, the high court observed: "Once [the driver] was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained." (Id., at p. 118, italics added.) Addressing the state's assertion that nevertheless a full search of the type that would be permissible incident to a custodial arrest also should be permissible " 'incident to citation' . . . because a suspect who is subject to a routine traffic stop may attempt to hide or destroy evidence related to his identity (e.g., a driver's license or vehicle registration)" (ibid.), the court disagreed, stating that "if a police officer is not satisfied with the identification furnished by the driver, this may be a basis for arresting him rather than merely issuing a citation." (Ibid.) The court in Knowles concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not provide the police a right to conduct a "full field search" (ibid., italics added) incident to the issuance of a citation, and hence found the full-scale warrantless search for contraband at issue in that case to be improper.

Defendants assert that Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. 113, implicitly precludes officers from conducting a warrantless search for registration or identification documents preparatory to the issuance of a traffic citation to a driver who fails to produce such documentation upon demand. We believe that Knowles is distinguishable. Unlike the situation in Webster and related decisions (and the cases presently before us), in Knowles ¾ as the high court itself emphasized ¾ the officer in that case already had issued the driver a citation (apparently the officer had obtained sufficient identifying information to complete that citation), and thereafter had conducted an unrelated full-scale warrantless search for contraband. Accordingly, the search at issue in Knowles, unlike those at issue in Webster and related cases (and those before us today) was not a limited one conducted for the narrow purpose of discovering required documentation that the driver had failed to produce upon demand and that was needed for the officer to issue a citation.

Indeed, in Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. 113, the court repeatedly stressed throughout its brief opinion that the issue presented was the validity of a "full search of the car" (id., at p. 114 [twice so characterizing], italics added), a "full-blown search" (id., at p. 115, italics added), or a "full field search" (id., at p. 118, italics added). Absent contrary direction from the high court, at this juncture we agree with the Attorney General that the court in Knowles addressed itself only to the question of allowing a full-scale warrantless search for contraband following the issuance of a traffic citation, and that the court did not address (nor do we read its opinion to cast doubt upon) the longstanding authority, established under California law as well as federal and sister state decisions, permitting a police officer to conduct under certain circumstances a limited warrantless search of a vehicle for required regulatory documentation, prior to issuing a traffic citation.

III.

We proceed to address whether the warrantless searches here at issue were proper under the Fourth Amendment.

A. Arturo D.

Arturo first asserts that Officer Rowe had no reason to enter the vehicle to search for registration because, Arturo claims, the record discloses that the trial court found that he earlier had given the registration to the officer. The record does not support this reading. At one point during direct examination, the officer testified that when he asked Arturo for his license and registration, Arturo produced neither item. Thereafter, during cross-examination, the officer testified that he could not recall whether Arturo had produced the requested documentation. Still later, following further discussion concerning the evidence on this point, and in response to defense counsel's argument that Officer Rowe had no right to be where he was or to search, the trial court interrupted defense counsel and asserted: "There's no suggestion that the officer was doing anything other than looking for documents of title and driver's identification." (Italics added.) To this, defense counsel replied, "That's right." The trial court immediately responded, "That's what he said."

This constitutes a finding by the trial court that when the officer searched the car, he was looking for both registration and driver identification. Of course, "the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial court. On appeal all presumptions favor the exercise of that power, and the trial court's findings on such matters, whether express or implied, must be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence." (People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160; People v. Martin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 687, 692 [because the trial court ruled on the suppression motion "after holding an evidentiary hearing pursuant to the motion, all factual conflicts must be resolved in the manner most favorable to the court's disposition of the motion"].) Here the trial court's finding is supported by substantial evidence &endash; Officer Rowe's testimony on direct examination that when he asked Arturo for his license and registration, Arturo produced neither. Accordingly, we must honor the trial court's finding that, when conducting his search, Officer Rowe was looking for both registration and license documentation.

Arturo also asserts that because he "candidly admitted" to Officer Rowe that he was 16 years of age and had no license, the officer accordingly had no right to search his vehicle for any license or other identification. Officer Rowe was not obligated to take the driver's word on these matters at face value, however. When the officer prepared to cite Arturo for a Vehicle Code violation, he had both a right and an obligation to ascertain the driver's true identity, to ensure that the driver's true name appeared on the citation and on the written promise to appear. We conclude that Officer Rowe was entitled to enter the vehicle to conduct a limited search for both registration and identification documents.

Arturo next asserts that a limited warrantless search under Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d 411, and related cases must be confined to "traditional repositories" such as a glove compartment or a sun visor, and that the area under a driver's seat is not a traditional repository for registration or identification documents. The Attorney General, by contrast, asserts that an officer is entitled to conduct a nonpretextual warrantless search for such documents in those locations where such documentation reasonably may be expected to be found.

We agree with the Attorney General. Although we observed in Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d 411, 431, that when the officer in that case "saw the wallet, [he] was confining his search to the visor and glove compartment, traditional repositories of auto registrations," we did not thereby restrict the scope of such a search to "traditional repositories" for auto registration documents. Instead, we merely explained that the officer in that case properly was searching in an area where such documentation reasonably could be expected to be found. Neither Webster nor any of the cases that it cited or that preceded it confined the scope of a permissible search for documentation to such so-called "traditional repositories." Subsequently, in Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th 137, 182, we observed that the warrantless search for documents in that case, "as in Webster," was confined to "the glove compartment, a traditional repository of vehicle registration." Again, as the Attorney General explains, "this reference to a 'traditional repository' [was] descriptive rather than restrictive."

Although, as noted above, the United States Supreme Court has not specifically approved or defined the scope of a warrantless search of a vehicle for registration or identification documentation, our conclusion that under certain circumstances limited searches for required regulatory documentation are permissible in those locations where such documentation reasonably may be expected to be found, appears to be consistent with the high court's decision in Class, supra, 475 U.S. 106, upholding a warrantless limited search to allow an officer to observe a car's VIN during a stop following a traffic violation.

Our conclusion is also consistent with general Fourth Amendment case law concerning the scope of permissible searches (e.g., Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 [protective search of passenger area of automobile is "limited to those areas where a weapon may be placed or hidden"]), and as noted above it is consistent with a number of prior California cases (see ante, at pp. 7-10) as well as cases from other jurisdictions (see ante, fn. 16). Finally, our conclusion also parallels the view of noted Fourth Amendment scholar Wayne R. LaFave, who, citing and describing Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d 411, and Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th 137, states: "Under a variety of circumstances, it is reasonable for the police to make a limited search of a vehicle in an effort to determine ownership. . . . [¶] . . . The better view is that if the driver has been given an opportunity to produce proof of registration but he is unable to do so, and even if he asserts that there is no such proof inside the car, the officer is not required to accept such an assertion at face value, at least when his 'previous conduct would . . . cast doubt upon his veracity'; at that point, the officer may look for registration papers 'on the dashboard, sun visor and steering column' and, if not found in those places or seen in plain view, in 'the glove compartment,' all 'places where it reasonably may be found.' " (3 LaFave, Search and Seizure, supra, § 7.4(d), pp. 566-567, italics added, fns. omitted; see also id., p. 567, fn. 131.)

We proceed to apply this standard to the facts of this case. As the Attorney General suggests in his briefs, some persons who are stopped for traffic violations may not wish to provide an officer with valid documentation showing the driver's true name or identity, or showing the name of the vehicle's owner. Some drivers who wish to avoid disclosing such documentation to the police may keep the documents under the driver's seat and yet disclaim their existence. Indeed, at the suppression hearing, the prosecutor argued that "it's not uncommon that people will shove their driver's license or their wallets underneath the seat while they're driving." The Attorney General argues that police officers, knowing this, reasonably may expect to find a wallet, or identification, or registration documents, under a driver's seat.

We conclude that case law supports the Attorney General's view. Although Arturo asserts that he was able to find only one case in which a wallet was found under a driver's seat, in fact numerous published appellate decisions report that drivers' wallets (and hence, often, identification) have been located under the front seats of vehicles. (E.g., People v. Barrick (1982) 33 Cal.3d 115, 121 [driver's wallet found under driver's seat]; Grudt v. City of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 575, 582, 587 [driver's wallet found under front seat]; People v. Bauer (1969) 1 Cal.3d 368, 372 [driver retrieved his wallet from under driver's seat]; People v. Alvarez (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 679, 685 [driver's wallet found under driver's seat]; Ingle v. Superior Court (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 188, 192 [driver's wallet found under driver's seat]; People v. Goss (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 443, 449 [defendant's wallet found under front seat]; People v. Bundesen (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 508, 510 [defendant's wallet found under front passenger seat, where defendant had been sitting]; People v. Bracamonte (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 980, 982 [driver's wallet found under driver's seat]; People v. Williams (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 389, 393 [driver placed his wallet under front seat before exiting from car].) Indeed, in People v. Hinger, a wallet containing the driver's identification was found under the front seat of the vehicle (in that case, the front passenger seat).

Published decisions of other state and federal courts also report numerous instances of drivers' wallets being found under the front seats of vehicles. (E.g., United States v. Dento (3d Cir. 1967) 382 F.2d 361, 363 [driver's wallet found under front seat]; Mallet v. Bowersox (8th Cir. 1998) 160 F.3d 456, 457 [driver's wallet found under front seat]; Cotton v. United States (9th Cir. 1967) 371 F.2d 385, 389-390 [driver's wallet found under front seat]; United States v. McCurdy (10th Cir. 1994) 40 F.3d 1111, 1113 [defendant's wallet found under front seat]; United States v. Gerlach (E.D.Mich. 1972) 350 F.Supp. 180, 182 [driver's wallet found under front seat]; United States v. Spitalieri (N.D. Ohio 1975) 391 F. Supp. 167, 170 [defendant's wallet found under front seat]; United States v. Day (E.D. Pa. 1971) 331 F.Supp. 254, 255 [driver's wallet found under driver's seat]; People v. Moore (Colo. 1995) 900 P.2d 66, 68 [wallet of defendant, a car passenger, found under front passenger seat]; Lewis v. State (Fl.Dist.Ct.App. 1998) 711 So.2d 205, 206 [defendant's wallet found under front seat]; People v. Jackson (Ill.App.Ct. 1987) 511 N.E.2d 923, 924 [defendant found victim's wallet under driver's seat in course of robbing him]; Huey v. State (Ind.Ct.App. 1987) 503 N.E.2d 623, 625 [driver's wallet found under driver's seat]; Commonwealth v. Ellis (Mass.Ct.App. 1981) 427 N.E.2d 1179, 1182 [driver's license found under front seat]; People v. Johnson (N.Y.App.Div. 1994) 614 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443 [defendant's wallet found under front seat]; State v. Hurd (S.C.Ct.App. 1996) 480 S.E.2d 94, 96 ["[u]nderneath the driver's seat, the deputies found a wallet containing Hurd's Georgia driver's license, Hurd's North Carolina identification card, some money, and a speeding ticket issued to Hurd in Lancaster County approximately four hours earlier"]; State v. Mitzlaff (Wash.Ct.App. 1995) 907 P.2d 328, 329 [driver's wallet found under driver's seat].)

These citations amply support the observation that "persons trying to hide their identity will often put their wallets underneath the seat." (State v. Gordon (Or.Ct.App. 1991) 821 P.2d 442, 443; see also, e.g., Mallet v. Bowersox, supra, 160 F.3d 456, 457 [as police officer approached the vehicle, the defendant "hid his wallet and identification under the front seat"; when the officer arrived at the side of the vehicle and requested the driver's license, the defendant "replied that he did not have his license with him and falsely claimed to be Anthony Mallett," his own brother].) We conclude that in the circumstances of this case, the area under Arturo's seat was a location where registration or identification documentation reasonably might be expected to be found.

Arturo insists that even if it is generally reasonable to search for identification or registration documents under the driver's seat, Officer Rowe exceeded the permissible scope of a proper limited search for such documents because he searched an area that the driver could not easily reach and conducted the search from behind the driver's seat. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.

As noted above, Officer Rowe first attempted to search under the seat from the front area of the truck's cab &endash; he reached blindly with his hand under the seat, but felt nothing. Immediately thereafter, the officer approached the same general area beneath the seat from a different vantage point, behind the driver's seat of the truck's extended cab, in a position that allowed him not only to feel, but also to view, the area under the seat. As the Attorney General observes, the space behind the truck's driver's seat would have afforded the officer an opportunity to inspect beneath the seat without restriction from the steering wheel and pedals, etc. At that point, Officer Rowe noticed and seized the pipe and the box in the middle of the area under the driver's seat.

Arturo asserts there is no evidence that this area was "easily accessible" to a driver from the front, or that it could be reached from the front. Initially, we note that the circumstance that a driver might deposit his or her wallet under the driver's seat from the front, while seated, does not necessarily mean that the driver plans to retrieve that wallet from a sitting position within the cab of the vehicle, instead of, for example, retrieving it from a position standing outside the open door. (See People v. Bauer, supra, 1 Cal.3d 368, 372 ["After a request for his registration," the defendant, from outside the car, "reached beneath the front seat and pulled out the folder portion of a wallet and extracted an expired, temporary driver's license"].) Moreover, there is no evidence that the area searched was not in fact accessible from the front, easily or otherwise, and Officer Rowe testified that he was searching the area that he believed "would . . . be in control of the driver, which would be the front area." Finally, even if the area searched was not easily accessible from the front, this factor would not be determinative. Items placed under a car seat can shift as the car moves, and an item, such as a wallet, placed originally in an easily accessible position near the front of a seat, may, through the movements of the car, migrate to another location under that seat. In this regard, there is no evidence that the floor area under the driver's seat was partitioned, so as to prevent items placed under the seat in the front from gravitating toward the center area under the seat. We agree with the Attorney General that although the prospective reach of a driver in relation to the location searched is a factor that can be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the search, it is not determinative.

Nor do we find Officer Rowe's decision to conduct the search from a vantage point behind the driver's seat to be unreasonable. We agree with the Attorney General that "an officer may conclude based upon a variety of factors such as the size of the vehicle, the size of the door opening, the height of the vehicle off the ground, and the positioning of the seat in relation to the steering wheel and pedal, that viewing the area under the driver's seat is more easily and reasonably accomplished from behind the driver's seat rather than from the front seat."

We reject Arturo's suggestion that allowing the limited search here at issue to be conducted from the more efficient vantage point of behind, rather than in front of, the seat constitutes a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. For example, although it is accepted that an officer under proper circumstances reasonably may search for documentation in a glove compartment, and might gain such access from the driver's seat area, an officer alternatively, and just as reasonably, may gain such access by opening the front passenger door and searching from that vantage point, rather than restricting his or her entry and positioning to the driver's side of the vehicle. (E.g., People v. Faddler, supra, 132 Cal.App.3d 607, 609.) We agree with the Attorney General that "once the officer is entitled to enter the car and look in the area under the driver's seat, the act of positioning his or her head behind the seat and looking forward constitutes no greater intrusion and implicates no greater expectation of privacy than positioning his or her head in front of the seat and looking backward. [¶] Moreover, artificially limiting the vantage point of an officer to essentially the driver's physical space, namely the area in front of the driver's seat, places an unjustified and potentially dangerous burden on the officer. If an officer is entitled to search under the driver's seat but is unable to safely position himself to view that area due to the presence of the steering column and pedals, his only option is to use his hand to blindly feel under the driver's seat or abandon an otherwise justified search."

In sum, the controlling question is whether the officer lawfully was entitled to search the location where he was looking. We conclude that it was reasonable for Officer Rowe to view the area underneath the driver's seat. The search was not rendered improper merely because the officer elected to view that area from behind the driver's seat. And if, as here, the officer observes contraband in plain view while conducting a proper limited search for regulatory documents, the contraband properly may be seized. (Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d 411, 431, and cases cited.)

Finally, Arturo asserts that Officer Rowe's search was unreasonable because the nature and quality of the intrusion on his Fourth Amendment interests outweighed the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. (See Class, supra, 475 U.S. 106, 118.) Arturo emphasizes that he gave Officer Rowe identifying information &endash; a name, an address in Vallejo, and a date of birth &endash; and accordingly, he argues, no important government interest justified or outweighed the ensuing intrusion upon his Fourth Amendment rights. The record establishes, however, that the officer stopped defendant in Suisun City, more than 17 miles from the Vallejo address given; it was 11:30 p.m., and the driver, a minor, admitted that the truck belonged neither to him nor to his passengers. The driver was unable to provide Officer Rowe with a driver's license or other documentation of his identity, and as the court found, the driver also failed to provide the officer with vehicle registration documentation. Officer Rowe reasonably decided to have the car towed. Prior to actually issuing the traffic citation, the officer decided to conduct a limited search in an area where he reasonably could expect to find the missing but required documentation. It is apparent that at that point Officer Rowe was attempting to determine for himself whether registration information concerning the vehicle's owner was available inside the vehicle, and also was attempting to verify and ascertain the driver's identity (and, indeed, whether he in fact was licensed as a driver), so that the citation could be issued in the driver's true name and show his true address. Under these circumstances, the officer's decision to conduct a limited search for registration and identification documents was reasonable, and the contraband found in plain view during the course of that limited search was properly obtained under the Fourth Amendment and not subject to exclusion.

The Court of Appeal below reached a contrary conclusion, finding instead that "the scope of the officer's intrusion went beyond that justified by the need to locate registration [or other identifying] documents and accordingly, it was unreasonable as a search for registration [or other identifying] documents." In support of its view, the court asserted as follows: (1) "[T]he problem with this search is that the officer testified that he first searched the area 'in control of the driver, which would be in the front area.' . . . It was only when Officer Rowe positioned himself behind the bench seat that the pipe was visible"; (2) "[W]e cannot say that the scope of a search for registration or identification documents in the cab of a pickup reasonably extends to virtually all areas in the physical proximity of the driver"; (3) "The officer did not testify that he was concerned for his personal safety and was searching for weapons"; and (4) "Nor did [the officer] testify that the area below the driver's seat could even be reached by the driver with or without the rear seat in use."

With regard to the Court of Appeal's first point &endash; that Officer Rowe testified he was searching the area within the driver's control, "which would be in the front area," but conducted that search from behind the driver's seat &endash; as we have explained above, the search was not improper merely because the officer elected to undertake it from behind the driver's seat rather than from in front of the driver's seat. Nor do we agree with the Court of Appeal's implication that approving the search here at issue would condone searches for required documentation of "virtually all areas in the physical proximity of the driver." As explained above, the scope of such a search is circumscribed, being limited to places where such documentation reasonably could be expected to be found.

Nor do the Court of Appeal's other two points support a contrary conclusion. It is insignificant that Officer Rowe failed to testify to any suspicion that the driver was armed, because the officer undertook the search in order to find required documentation. Pursuant to Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d 411, and related cases, the limited search here at issue was justified on that basis alone. Finally, the Court of Appeal's assertion that Officer Rowe did not testify that the area below the driver's seat could be reached is problematic as a factual matter on this record, and in any event, as we explained ante, at pages 25-26, whether the searched area was or was not easily within reach of the driver while positioned in the driver's seat is a factor to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a limited search for documentation, but is not a dispositive factor.

Accordingly, we conclude in Arturo D. (S085213) that the trial court properly denied the suppression motion, and that the Court of Appeal erred in determining otherwise.

B. Hinger

Defendant Hinger asserts that the area underneath a front passenger seat is not a traditional repository of registration or identification documentation, and that pursuant to the Attorney General's proposed test, the "entire car and all of its compartments" might be subject to a Webster-type search for required documentation, in violation of the teaching of Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. 113.

As noted above, the dispositive question is not whether the area searched is a traditional repository for registration or identification documentation. Limited warrantless searches for required registration and identification documentation are permissible when, following the failure of a traffic offender to provide such documentation to the citing officer upon demand, the officer conducts a search for those documents in an area where such documents reasonably may be expected to be found. Under this standard, an officer may not search for such documents on pretext (cf. Class, supra, 475 U.S. 106, 122, fn. * (conc. opn. of Powell, J.) ["An officer may not use VIN inspection as a pretext for searching a vehicle for contraband or weapons"]), or without first demanding that they be produced (see United States v. Lopez (C.D.Cal. 1979) 474 F.Supp. 943, 948-949 [search was unreasonable when officer never asked driver for such documentation and ignored plainly visible registration information posted in car window]), and an officer may not search in containers or locations in which such documents are not reasonably expected to be found. (Ibid. [search of crumpled fast-food bag under seat]; State v. Acosta, supra, 801 P.2d 489, 493 [search for registration in enclosed "rear interior compartment"].) We emphasize that the standard we reaffirm today circumscribes the scope of a Webster search for documents, and, contrary to defendant Hinger's assertion, does not threaten to condone the equivalent of the full-scale search for contraband prohibited by the high court in Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. 113.

Defendant Hinger was unable to produce the required registration or license documents upon Officer Skinner's reasonable demand. Hinger appears to suggest that such documentation would not reasonably be expected to be found under a front passenger seat, but on the facts of this case Officer Skinner had reason to extend marginally his search for Hinger's wallet. As noted, the officer had seen Hinger look into the g